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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
JOHN P. DORITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
v. 
JEANNE D. DORITY, 
Defendant- Respondent. 
---0000000---
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 17376 
This is a divorce action in which the plaintiff husband 
appeals from the property distribution and alimony award entered by the 
trial jud p;e. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a day-long trial before the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, a divorce was granted to the parties. The husband was awarded 
in excess of one-half of the parties' accumulated property, but was 
ordered to pay a modest fixed-term alimony award to the wife. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent Jeanne D. Dority respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm in its entirety the Decree fashioned by the trial 
court and, additionally, order an award to her of such sum as will 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasonably compensate her for the attorney's fees incurred in the 
defense of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-respondent (hereinafter "~.1rs. Dority") deems it 
necessary to present a concise statement of the facts of this case since 
the statement presented by plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter 
"~.1r. Dority") fails to rei1ect accurately all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances at issue. 
At the time the parties were married--almost a quarter century 
ago in 1956--each had obtained essentially all of their formal 
education. (Tr. at 5 and 61; R. at 202 and 258.) ~1r. Dority was a 
young patent attorney with I. B. ~.1. earning approximately $12, 000 per 
year. (Tr. at 6; R. at 203.) During their marriage, the parties raised 
four children, all of whom had attained their majority prior to the 
trial. (Tr. at 8; R. at 205.) 
The parties moved four times., keeping pace with Mr. Dority's 
employment, eventually locating in September of 1966, in Devon, 
Pennsylvania, where they purchased a home on Schoolhouse Lane. (Tr. at 
9-10; R. at 206-07.) This residence was occupied by the parties and 
their children until August of 1972, when ~1rs. Dority and the four 
children moved from the home. (Tr. at 12; R. at 209.) The parties have 
been separated since that time. 
2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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A separate maintenance action was commenced in Pennsylvania 
in 1972 (Tr. at 12-13; R. at 239-40) and, in June of 1977, Mr. Dority 
instituted divorce proceedings in Pennsylvania (Tr. at 15; R. at 212). 
In the fall of 1978, Mr. Dority was transferred to Utah and, 
in 1979, he voluntarily elected to institute a Utah divorce action, even 
though the Pennsylvania proceedings were still pending at that time. 
(R. 2-4 and Tr. at 44; R. at 241.) Thereafter, ~.1r. Dority filed a 
petition in the Pennsylvania divorce proceeding seeking to discontinue 
that action based upon his residence here in Utah. 
At the time of the trial, Mr. Dority was 55 years of age and 
employed as a senior patent attorney with the Sperry Corporation. 
(Tr. at 20; R. at 247.) He was earning in excess of $51, 000 per year. 
(_!Q..) On the other hand, ~1rs. Dority was 52 years of age and suffering 
from ir:ipaired eyesight as a result of a cataract condition that had 
earlier necessitated surgery. (Tr. at 80; R. at 277.) She was employed 
at Drexel University in Pennsylvania, receiving a gross annual income of 
$16,824. (Exhibit D-9, received R. at 274, reproduced infra at A-3.) 
At the time of trial, the parties' former residence on 
Schoolhouse Lane in Devon, Pennsylvania, had an appraised value of 
$95, 000 (Deposition of Laurence Scott) and was subject to a mortgage in 
the amount of $16,000 (Tr. at 32; R. at 229), with an additional $17,000 
owed to Mrs. Dority's family for the repayment of funds advanced for its 
maintenance and improvement (Tr. at 73-74; R. at 270-71). Accordingly, 
3 
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the Pennsylvania property had a net value of $62, 000. In addition, 
Mr. Dority had purchased a $100,000 house here in Salt Lake County, 
which was subject to a $51,000 mortgage (Tr. at 33; R. at 230) and an 
obligation in the amount of $30, 500, incurred to obtain the downpayment. 
Accordingly, the Salt Lake property had a net value of $18, 500. The 
parties also owned in excess of $112, 000 in securities, which Mr. Dority 
had placed in his own name. (See, Exhibit D-8, received R. at 278, 
reproduced infra at A-1.) Mr. Dority further had a vested interest in a 
retirement fund with a value at trial in excess of $85,000. (Tr. at 35; 
R. at 232.) While Mr. Dority claims that most of the stock owned at the 
time of trial had been acquired after the parties' separation in 1972, 
it was clear from his testimony that he had sold a substantial amount of 
stock acquired prior to the separation in order to reaquire stock 
following the separation. (Tr. at 37-39; R. at 234-36.) 
In dividing the assets acquired during the tenure of the 
parties' 25-year marria~e, the trial court awarded approximately 
$160, 000 in assets to Mr. Dority, while awarding only approximately 
$120,000 of assets to Mrs. Dority. (See Schedule "A", infra at A-2.) 
During the marriage, Mr. Dority progressed from a young 
attorney to a highly successful corporate patent attorney, with a 
consequent more than quadrupling of his annual income. Mrs. Dority, on 
the other hand, gave up her job as a newspaper reporter and remained at 
4 
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home, rearing the parties' family and tending to their household needs. 
(Tr. at 62; R. at 259.) 
Notwithstanding that he received some $40, 000 more than his 
wife and well over half of the combined assets, Mr. Dority appeals from 
the trial court's property distribution, challenging that it is unfair 
to him. Notwithstanding that the trial court ordered h:ir.J to pay only 
$500 per month in alimony, and only for a three-year period, ~.1r. Dority 
appeals from the trial court's alimony award, cla:ir.Jing that it is 
unreasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED DECREE 
FASHIONED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PRESUMED PROPER AND SHOULD 
NOT BE MODIFIED ABSENT A CLEAR SHOWING BY THE APPELLANT 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION OR WAS 
MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
This Court has on innumerable occasions held that, while a 
divorce action is equitable in nature, the ruling of the trial judge is 
favored with a presumption of propriety and accuracy. It is only in 
those few instances in which the appellant can clearly demonstrate a 
manifest abuse of discretion or misapplication of law that the decree 
fashioned by the trial judge will be disturbed. Such a proposition is 
logically grounded upon the advantaged position of the trial court, who 
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has observed the witnesses, heard the testir:iony. and become acquainted 
at least to a lir.iited degree with the parties, their problems, and their 
properties. 
In a tacit recognition of the fact that the Findings of Fact 
entered by Judge Sawaya are supported by sufficient credible evidence, 
Mr. Dority relies upon the equitable nature of divorce proceedings in 
his invitation to this Court to revamp the original decree. A sir:iilar 
invitation was refused in Eastr:ian v. Eastman, 558 P. 2d 514 C Utah 1976), 
with the observation that: 
We have many times stated that even 
though proceedings in divorce cases are 
equitable, in which this Court may review 
the evidence, due to the prerogatives and 
advantaged position of the trial court, 
we give considerable deference to his 
findings and judgment; and we do not 
disturb ther:i unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary, or he has 
abused his discretion, or has misapplied 
principles of law. 
558 P.2d at 515-16 (footnote citations omitted). It is, therefore, 
incumbent upon the appellant in a divorce case to demonstrate some clear 
abuse of discretion or misapplication of law before this Court will act 
to revise any aspect of the original decree. 
This Court has long held that its inherent power to supplant 
the trial judge's discretion is to be exercised only judiciously and 
infrequently. For example, in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 
296 P.2d 977 0956), it was held that: 
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The more recent pronouncements of this 
court, and the policy to which we adhere, 
are to the effect that the trial judge 
has considerable latitude of discretion 
in such matters and that his judgment 
should not be changed lightly, and in 
fact, not at all, unless it works such a 
manifest injustice or inequity as to 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion. 
296 P.2d at 981 (footnote omitted). 
Since the plan of distribution and decree fashioned by the 
trial judge will be modified only if the result of a clearly 
demonstrated abuse of discretion or of a manifest misapplication of 
relevant law, the burden is upon the party dissatisfied with the trial 
court's decision to demonstrate such error. This traditional 
proposition was recognized in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 
1977), in which the principles applicable to this appeal were concisely 
summarized by this Court: 
The trial court, in a divorce action, 
has considerable latitude of discretion 
in adjusting financial and • property 
interests. A party appealing therefrom 
has ·the burden to prove there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law resulting in substantial and prejudi-
cial error; or the evidence clearly pre-
ponderated against the findings; or such 
a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
565 P. 2d at 410 (footnote citation omitted). Essentially identical 
statements of this principle can be found in many other Utah cases, 
including Baker v. Baker, 551 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1976); Hansen v. Hansen, 
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537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975); and Mitchell v. t.Htchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 
1974). 
Under the standards of review traditionally applied by this 
Court, the property distribution and alimony award entered in this case 
are presumed valid and will be affirmed unless Mr. Dority has 
demonstrated that Judge Sawaya has so clearly abused his discretion as 
to result in substantial prejudice or has misapplied the relevant law of 
this state to such a degree that the decree entered is manifestly unfair 
and inequitable. Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977); Spangler 
v. Spangler, 561 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1977); Pearson v. Pearson, 
561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977); Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 
197 4); Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429 P. 2d 35 (1967); t.1ichelsen 
v. ~1ichelsen, 14 Utah 2d 328, 383 P. 2d 932 ( 1963). 
POINT 11. APPELLANT HAS ENTIRELY FAILED TO MEET 
HIS BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING SOME ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR 
MISAPPLICATION OF LAW; THEREFORE, THE ORIGINAL DECREE SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
A. The trial court appropriately refused to be bound by 
Pennsylvania law. 
Although appellant in his brief (App. Br. at 11-12) recognizes 
the great discretion accorded the trial court in domestic matters, he 
then myopically ignores this principle, arguing that the trial court 
8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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erroneously refused to be bound by certain arbitrary provisions of 
Pennsylvania law. Mr. Dority voluntarily filed this divorce action here 
in Utah and, thereafter, voluntarily sought the dismissal of the 
Pennsylvania action, which he had earlier filed. Notwithstanding his 
clearly manifest election to obtain his divorce in Utah, Mr. Dority now 
seeks to require the trial court to apply selectively portions of the 
domestic relations law of Pennsylvania, which ~.Ir. Dority apparently 
believes to favor his position. The unreasonableness is apparent of 
Mr. Dority's demand that his wife (who was still a Pennsylvania resident 
at the time of the trial of this action) come to Utah to defend the 
divorce proceeding but then be faced with the application of certain 
isolated provisions of Pennsylvania law. 
~.1r. Dority is a Utah resident. He voluntarily filed this 
divorce action here in Utah. The overwhelming bulk of the parties' 
assets were located in Utah. Mr. Dority abandoned the divorce action 
that he had once commenced in Pennsylvania. Yet, he now argues that the 
trial court should have applied Pennsylvania law. 
The trial court, of course, had the statutory jurisdiction to 
divide fully the property of the parties. Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), broadly states: 
When a decree of divorce is made, 
the court may make such orders in 
relation to the • . • property and 
parties ••• as may be equitable •• 
§30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated ( 1953 as amended). Accordingly, once 
9 
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the jurisdictional prerequisites were met, the trial court had broad 
power to divide the property of the parties in an equitable manner. 
The bulk of the parties' property was located here in Utah; 
accordingly, it was appropriate that this property, at least, be divided 
pursuant to Utah law. In In re marriage of Ramsey, 526 P.2d 319 
(Ct. App. Colo. 1974), the trial court's refusal to distribute property 
pursuant to Colorado law was reversed: 
An action for dissolution of 
marriage is a proceeding in rem 
~.1oreover, where, as here, a 
petitioner . • . has possession of 
property located in Colorado • . . the 
court acquires control of the property by 
virtue of its jurisdiction over peti-
tioner, and the court thereby obtains 
jurisdiction to determine the appropriate 
disposition of that property. 
526 P. 2d 320 (citations omitted). Likewise in this case, the trial 
court properly distributed the property of these parties in accordance 
with Utah law. 
Moreover, in Smestad v. Smestad, 94 Idaho 181, 484 P.2d 730 
(1971), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated a similar proposition, but 
extended its scope to include property of the parties located in a 
foreign jurisdiction. The wife contended on appeal that the trial court 
had erred in distributing property located outside the state of Idaho. 
The court held, however, that so long as personal jurisdiction had been 
obtained, it was appropriate for the trial court to apply its law in 
10 
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order to distribute property located outside of the state of Idaho. 
(484 P.2d at 733). ~.1r. Dority does not dispute that the trial court had 
obtained personal jurisdiction over both parties. 
In Noble v. Noble, 26 Ariz. App. 89, 546 P.2d 358 (1976), this 
concept was applied even to property located in a foreign nation. It 
was argued on appeal that the trial court had erred both in attempting 
to effect a distribution of the foreign property and in basing the 
distribution upon the provisions of its local state law. These 
contentions were rejected on appeal: 
We agree that the courts of this 
state do not have jurisdiction to 
determine title to property in another 
state or foreign country. However, we do 
not view the trial court's determination 
of the interest of the parties in the 
Denmark property as determining the title 
to that property. Rather, we view the 
trial court's determination to simply be, 
as between the parties before the court, 
what interest they held in the foreign 
jurisdiction property. This the trial 
court may properly do. 
546 P.2d at 361. In the present case, it was appropriate both for the 
trial court to divide and distribute the relatively small portion of the 
parties' property that was not located within the state of Utah and for 
the trial court to have divided that property under the applicable 
provisions of Utah law. 
Appellant does not contend that the overall distribution of 
the parties' property effected by the trial court was inherently unjust 
11 
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or inequitable; rather, r.1r. Dority simply complains that the trial court 
did not find itself to be bound by certain provisions of Pennsylvania 
law. The trial court's award of the residence in Pennsylvania to 
~1rs. Dority makes a great deal of common sense--~1r. Dority effectively 
abandoned that house two years ago when he moved to Utah and knowingly 
allowed it to go to the point of foreclosure, thus requiring ~.1rs. Dority 
to take the property back and care for it. (Tr. at 48 and 72-73; 
R. at 245 and 269-70.) Additionally, !.1r. Dority has chosen to reside 
here in Utah, while Mrs. Dority remains in Pennsylvania. Under such 
circumstances, it was logical for the trial court to award the Utah 
property to ~.1r. Dority, and the Pennsylvania property to :.1rs. Dority. 
Since in the overall distribution of the property, r.1r. Dority 
was awarded well over half of the parties' assets, he has no legitimate 
complaint with the distribution fashioned by the trial court. 
B. The total property distribution effected by the trial 
court is entirely appropriate. 
The assets of the parties, as reflected by their testimony, 
are summarized in defendant's Exhibit 8, which was received into 
evidence by the trial court. (Tr. at 81; R. at 278.) This exhibit is 
reproduced in the Appendix to this brief. (Infra at A-1.) At trial, 
~1r. Dority testified that the Sperry Corporation stock was worth $93,805 
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(Tr. at 34; R. at 231) and the trial court interlineated that amount; 
therefore, the assets actually total $286, 316. 
As noted earlier, the trial court awarded $162,119.50 of these 
assets to r.1r. Dority, well in excess of one-half. The distribution of 
the assets effected by the trial court's Decree is summarized as 
Schedule "A" in the Appendix. (Infra at A-2.) 
Examination of the distribution effected by the trial court 
makes clear that Mr. Dority's complaints about the property distribution 
are without merit. The trial court managed to give ~.1r. Dority well in 
excess of one-half of the parties' assets while at the same time 
implementing the logical result of leaving each party with one of their 
two homes. Mr. Dority claims that the trial court should be directed to 
credit him with "the equivalent value of the separate property appellant 
brought into the marriage which was traced to the acquisition of the 
Devon real property". (App. Br. at 14.) ~1r. Dority did not document 
this disputed claim at trial, yet, this is precisely what the trial 
court has done in distributing more than one-half of the total assets to 
Mr. Dority. 
The trial court has certainly not abused its discretion in 
fashioning the property distribution. As this Court recently observed 
in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980): 
There is no fixed formula upon which 
to determine a division of properties, it 
is the prerogative of the court to make 
whatever disposition of property as it 
13 
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deems fair, equitable, and necessary for 
the protection and welfare of the 
parties. In the division of marital 
property, the trial judge has wide 
discretion, and his findings will not be 
disturbed unless the record indicates an 
abuse thereof. 
615 P. 2d at 1222 (footnote citations omitted). The trial court cannot 
be said, in this case, to have abused its "wide discretion" by making 
the logical distribution of one house to each party, while at the same 
time ensuring that ~1r. Dority receive in excess of one-half of the 
parties• total properties. 
Mr. Dority's contentions on appeal are nothing more than an 
attempt to augment the already generous property distribution fashioned 
by the trial court. He, in effect, complains that he was awarded only 
something in excess of one-half of the parties' total assets. However, 
property distributions much more favorable to the wife have been 
routinely upheld by this Court. For example, in Tremayne v. Tremayne, 
116 Utah 483, 211 P. 2d 452 (1949), the trial court awarded approximately 
four-fifths of the parties• property to the wife. In upholding that 
distribution, this Court noted that the distribution of property 
is in the discretion of the trial court 
which will not be disturbed unless the 
court abuses its discretion. The facts 
of each divorce case are different and 
each must be determined on what is 
equitable to the parties under the facts 
of the case •• 
Through schooling [the husband's J 
earning capacity has been substantially 
14 
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increased during the marriage and [the 
wife's] earning capacity has not been 
proportionately increased during that 
time. • • • How far either one would 
have gone without the other is largely a 
matter of conjecture. The facts and 
circumstances amply justified the court 
in dividing the property as it did even 
if treated as a division of the property 
but does not require that she be awarded 
a larger portion thereof. The court 
acted well within its discretion and we 
will not disturb its decision thereon. 
211 P.2d at 454 (numerous citations omitted). 
In his brief, r.lr. Dority argues that this Court's decision in 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980), supports his 
contention that his alleged contribution, subsequently traced to the 
Pennsylvania real property, should have been reimbursed to him by the 
trial court. An examination of the facts of that case reveals, 
however, that any reliance upon it by Mr. Dority is misplaced. In 
Jesperson, the marriage was only of five years' duration and the parties 
were 68 and 73 years of age at the time of their marriage. The husband 
had brought "virtually no assets" to the marriage, while the wife 
brought in excess of $40, 000 in assets, more than half of which were in 
cash. (610 P.2d at 327.) tiloreover, this Court emphasized that neither 
of the parties, being of advanced age, were gainfully employed; thus, no 
assets were produced during the marriage. <..!.!!.·) This Court held that 
the trial court had not abused its discretion by fashioning a property 
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distribution which, in effect, reimbursed the wife for the assets which 
she had brought to the marriage. 
In the present case, the marriage occurred 25 years ago 
between vigourous and productive young adults; ~.1r. Dority's salary has 
quadrupled to over $50,000 per year; and assets well in excess of 
one-quarter million dollars have been amassed during the marriage. By 
no stretch of the imagination can this Court's holding in Jes person be 
said to stand for the proposition that Mr. Dority is entitled to a 
dollar-for-dollar reimbursement of the assets that he (allegedly) 
brought to this marriage. 
While ~.1r. Dority asserts that his testimony that he brought 
some $26, 000 in government bonds to the marriage was "unrefuted" 
(App. Br. at 6), Hrs. Dority testified that he never told her about this 
money; that to her knowledge he brought no such assets with him to the 
marriage; and that immediately after their marriage he had to borrow 
$500, previously given to her by her father, in order to repair the 
roof. (Tr. at 62-63; R. at 259-60.) Accordingly, the trial court may 
also have found Mr. Dority's belated claim to these assets to have been 
inherently incredible. 
Throughout his argument that the property distribution should 
be modified, Mr. Dority myopically isolates the Pennsylvania real 
property, failing to recognize that the overall distribution is entirely 
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fair and cannot be said to constitute an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court. 
POINT III. THE THREE-YEAR ALIMONY AWARD ENTERED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT IS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD NOT BE MODIFIED. 
The trial court ordered that ~.1r. Dority pay $18,000 in 
alimony, at the rate of $500 per month for three years. On appeal, 
Mr. Dority contends that this award "should be vacated." Again, 
Mr. Dority suggests that since he once lived in Pennsylvania, 
Pennsylvania law should be applied with regard to alimony. He admits, 
however, that the Pennsylvania law in effect at the time of the trial 
permitted the award of alimony. (App. Br. at 17-18.) Although it was 
he who chose to bring this action in Utah, Mr. Dority now contends that 
the trial court erred by not applying Pennsylvania law to its alimony 
award. Such a contention is without merit and, not surprisingly, 
!.1r. Dority fails to cite a single case or authority in support of it. 
The trial court's modest alimony award to !\1rs. Dority is 
appropriate and in full compliance with the decisions of this Court, 
which have consistently held that an ex wife is entitled to an award of 
alimony based upon her health, the duration of her marriage, the 
standard of living to which she has become accustomed during that 
marriage, and the former husband's demonstrated income potential. 
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These factors were recently recognized by this Court in Gramme 
v. Gramme, 587 P. 2d 144 (Utah 1978), which Mr. Dority cites in his brief 
(App. Br. at 20). In the present case, Mrs. Dority has experienced 
continuing difficulties with her eyesight and is earning less than 
one-quarter of r.ir. Dority's income. ~.1oreover, this is a long-term 
marriage, during which Mrs. Dority has raised the parties' family and 
maintained their household, while ~.ir. Dority has prospered in his 
career. Under the factors enumerated by this Court in Gramme, the 
short-term alimony ordered by the trial court cannot be said to 
constitute an abuse of discretion. 
l\lr. Dority's contention (App. Br. at 17) that the three-year 
alimony award entered by the trial court is double what he has been 
paying to ~.lrs. Dority under the temporary Pennsylvania support order is 
misleading because it fails to recognize that in Pennsylvania she was 
receiving not only $250 in alimony but an additional $400 in support for 
a total of $650 per month. Equally misleading is Mr. Dority's assertion 
(App. Br. at 18) that he had paid "over $32, 000 by the time of trial" in 
temporary support to his wife. In so stating, he wholly overlooks that 
during the corresponding period he had earned well over $300, 000. 
(Tr. at 46-47; R. at 243-44.) Clearly this is not--as ?.ir. Dority 
contends--an "enormous windfall". (App. Br. at 18.) Nor is alimony of 
$500 per month for a three-year period a "very generous award". C_!i·) 
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The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Mrs. Dority's 
monthly living expenses total $2, 272.69. These expenses were itemized 
in defendant's Exhibit 10, which was received into evidence by the trial 
court. (Tr. at 79; R. at 276.) A copy of this exhibit is reproduced in 
the Appendix. (Infra at A-4.) Accordingly, ~.Ir. Dority's protestations 
(App. Br. at 18) that his former wife "had a monthly expendable income 
of $1, 332. 02" is unavailing and amounts to nothing more than a tacit 
admission of her need for some degree of continued support. 
In light of the long duration of the marriage, Mr. Dority's 
demonstrated substantial income potential, and the standard of living to 
which his wife had grown accustomed during the marriage, the trial 
court's award of alimony in the amount of $500 per month for a limited 
three-year period cannot be said to be an abuse of discretion. These 
very factors have long been held by this Court to be of significance in 
determining the wife's entitlement to alimony. For example, in Wilson 
v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956), the marriage had lasted 15 
years and the principal issue on appeal was the appropriate amount of 
alimony to be awarded. This Court held that in determining alimony, 
[t]he court's responsibility is to 
endeavor to provide a just and equitable 
adjustment of [the parties'] economic 
resources so that the parties can 
reconstruct their lives on a happy and 
useful basis. In doing so it is 
necessary for the court to consider 
• • • an appraisal of all of the 
attendant facts and circumstances: the 
duration of the marriage; the ages of the 
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parties; their social positions and 
standards of living; their health; 
considerations relative to children; the 
money and property they possess and how 
it was acquired; and their capabilities 
and training and their present and 
potential incomes. 
296 P.2d at 979-80 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Application of 
these factors in the present case renders inescapable the conclusion 
that the trial court acted well within its sound discretion. 
The policy that the alimony award be sufficient to enable the 
wife to maintain the social status and standard of living to which she 
has become accustomed during her marriage has been emphasized in other 
recent decisions of this Court. In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 
(Utah 1977), it was held in connection with a twenty-year marriage 
that: 
[Tl he most important function of alimony 
is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard Of 
living she enjoyed during marriage, and 
to prevent the wife from becoming a 
public charge. 
565 P.2d at 411 (emphasis added). And in Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 453 
(Utah 1978), in response to the remonstrances of a physician to the 
trial court's alimony award, this Court observed: 
How the defendant, or any one on his 
behalf, could even suggest that a wife 
who had devoted 21 years to her marriage 
and reared a family should be turned out 
to subsist on her own is as discordant to 
our sense of justice as it was to the 
trial judge. 
585 P.2d at 455. This observation would appear equally applicable to 
the present case. 
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During his marriage, Mr. Dority's salary quadrupled from just 
over $12,000 to the more than $50,000 he presently earns as a senior 
corporate patent attorney. During their marriage, the Dorities amassed 
assets in excess of one-quarter million dollars. Mr. Dority now 
contends that the trial court's award of alimony of $500 per month for 
three years was an abuse of discretion; any such contention is utterly 
without merit. 
POINT IV. RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER 
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THIS APPEAL. 
Due to Mr. Dority's dissatisfaction with Judge Sawaya's 
rulings, Mrs. Dority has been burdened with the costs of this appeal. 
This Court has frequently held that, in such circumstances, an award is 
appropriate to cover the added costs necessitated by the dissatisfied 
party's appeal. For example, in Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 
(Utah 1977), the husband, disenchanted with the trial judge's award, 
appealed with the usual contention that the property distribution was 
unfair and inequitable. The original decree was affirmed and the case 
remanded to the trial court for the assessment and award of attorney's 
fees incurred by the wife as a result of the appeal: 
Inasmuch as the plaintiff has been 
put to the necessity of defending this 
appeal, which we have found to be with-
out merit, it is our opinion that she is 
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justified in her request for a further 
award of attorney's fees in addition to 
the modest amount of $200 allowed her in 
the trial court. 
569 P. 2d at 1106. To the same effect are Fletcher v. Fletcher, 
615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980); and Baker v. Baker, 551 P.2d 1263 (Utah 
1976). In this case, an award of attorney's fees on appeal is 
particularly appropriate, since the trial court did not award fees to 
either party at the trial, thus requiring each to bear their own costs. 
The only aspect of Judge Sawaya's decree with which ~.1r. Dority 
does not quibble is the granting of the divorce itself. As a result of 
this appeal, Mrs. Dority has incurred substantial additional expense. 
It is, therefore, appropriate that she be reinbursed for those 
additional expenses necessitated by this groundless appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In divorce cases, this Court has invariably held that the 
decision of the trial judge is to be respected unless it clearly appears 
that he has abused his discretion or manifestly misapplied relevant law. 
This standard of review appropriately grants deference to the advantaged 
position of the trial judge, who has seen the parties, listened to their 
testimony, and had a personal opportunity to perceive their problems and 
circumstances. Nowhere in his brief does appellant isolate a single 
instance in which Judge Sawaya's findings are not supported by the 
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evidence; rather, Mr. Dority states and restates his dissatisfaction 
with the trial judge's ruling--such is neither an appropriate nor a 
sufficent ground for reversal or modification. 
M.r. Dority was transferred to Utah in 1978 and in 1979 he 
filed the present action here in Utah. He also voluntarily petitioned 
to dismiss a Pennsylvania divorce action that he had earlier filed. 
Only a single asset of the parties remains in Pennsylvania. Yet 
~.lr. Dority now complains that the trial court refused to consider itself 
bound by certain arbitrary provisions of Pennsylvania's domestic 
relations law, which M.r. Dority apparently deems favorable to his 
position. The trial court correctly refused to consider itself bound by 
Pennsylvania law. 
Even if, through an application of Pennsylvania law, 
Mr. Dority is entitled to a one-half interest in the Pennsylvania real 
property, the overall property distribution fashioned by the trial court 
is sufficiently generous to him that modification is not required. 
Dealing with assets totaling approximately $286, 000, the trial court 
awarded $162, 000 to Mr. Dority and only $124, 000 to respondent. The 
overall property distribution is, therefore, entirely fair and equitable 
and well within the sound discretion of the trial court. Modification 
is unnecessary and would be inappropriate. 
In the dissolution of this marriage, which had lasted for a 
quarter century, the trial court ordered that M.r. Dority pay alimony for 
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only three years at the rate of $500 per month. In light of 
Mrs. Dority's impaired vision, the fact that her income is a mere 
quarter of Mr. Dority's, and the expenses inherent in the standard of 
living enjoyed by Mrs. Dority during the marriage, such a modest alimony 
award is certainly not an abuse of discretion. 
Although Mr. Dority points to the fact that he has paid a 
substantial sum to his wife as temporary alimony during their 
separation, he ignores the fact that during the same period he earned 
ten times that amount. The short-tero alimony award entered by the 
court is entirely reasonable and must be affirmed. 
Due to this appeal, which results solely froo ~1r. Dority's 
disenchantment with Judge Sawaya's sound decisions, ~.1rs. Dority has 
incurred unnecessary but significant expense. Under the decisions of 
this Court, it is appropriate that she be awarded such additonal sum as 
will reasonably compensate her for the attorney's fees incurred in the 
defense of this appeal. 
The decree and property distribution entered by Judge Sawaya 
reflect careful, wise and judicious consideration of the parties and 
their properties. Those orders, carefully fashioned by the trial judge 
who has had an opportunity to observe and come to know the parties, 
should not be disturbed absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion or 
manifest injustice. No such showing has been made in this case and 
Judge Sawaya's decision should be affirmed in its entirety. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMlTTED thi• ~day of~ 1981. 
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Asset 





Lawrence S. Scott) 
(16 ,000) (Mortgage) 
(17,000) (Gladys Doseff 
Equity 
$ to restore house) $ 62,000.00 









Loan at Merrill Lynch 
secured by stocks 
Devon House Fund 
TIAA-CREF 
Sperry Vested Retirement 
(12/31/79) 
1,102 shares at 3 3/5 
1,511 shares at 55 3/8 
220 shares at 65 5/8 
Furniture (parties each have comparable values) 
Automobiles (parties each have comparable values) 
Total Assets Less Liabilities 













$276 I 099 • 00 
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SCHEDULE "A" 
Distribution per Decree 
464 Schoolhouse Lane 
Devon, PA 
(Less mtg. & $17,000 loan 
to wife's mother) 
3621 Oakview Drive 
Asbestos Ltd. 
Sperry Corp. 
850 to wife at 55 3/8 
844 to husband at 55 3/8 
IBM Stock 
100 to wife at 65 5/8 
120 to husband at 65 5/8 
Loan at Merrill Lynch 
(secured by stocks) 
Devon House Fund 
TIAA-CREF (wife's retirement fund) 



















Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT _ 
CURRENT INCOME OF PARTIES 
Plaintiff - John P. Dority 
Annual Income 
1976 $ 46,739.00 
1977 
1978 (distortion for moving 
expense) 
1979 
Monthly Salary from Sperry 
(exclusive of dividends) 
Less State and Federal withholding 
Less Social Security ($1,587.00 per 
year divided by 12) 




Defendant - Jeanne Dority 
Annual Income 




(Schoolhouse Lane - gross rent $650 less 
payments, taxes, and maintenance $350) 
Total 
Less State, Federal and City taxes 
Less Social Security 
Net Monthly Expendable Income 
Without Support From Plaintiff 
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DEFENDANT'S 
.:·. EXHIBIT : 
MONTHLY EXPENSES OF JEANNE DORITY 
Item 
Rent 
(currently $472, will go up $40 
10/1/80) 
Real Property Insurance 
Maintenance 
Food and Household Supplies 
Telephone 








Faculty Club Dues 






Additional Income Tax 
(Assuming alimony payment $1,200 per 
























*All four sons have their home address with defendant. 
Doug, home, full-time college-Drexel 
Tom, home, work, full-time college Fall 1980 
Ben, away college, home 3 1/2 months summer 
Jim, away college, intends all this year away 
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I certify that on this J_ day of ~ 1981, I placed with 
"The Runner Service" two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to 
be delivered to David M .• Swope and John K. Mangum, lnELSEN & SENIOR, 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
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